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important pec\.nn.ar-1 eonLr:tour:ions to raru1J.y l.ncome.
There are rational economic motivations for high fertility.
The extent to which purely economic factors affect fertility decisions remains unclear, but it is increasingly evident that the answers to this question hinges on the answers to two other questions: What are the relevant economic factors, and how can they best be conceptualized? In the growing literature on the rationality of high fertility, two· distinct theorctical perspectives are emerging. The first perspective represents an extension of conventional neoclassical models of household decision making, often Proponents of both these theoretical perspectives have made important contributions to our understanding of fertility decisions. But neither perspective provides a satisfactory framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of children and the ways in which these are affected by the process of economic development. Neoclassical models ignore non-market factors, such as patriarchy, which affect transfers of income and labor time between men and women, parents and children. Institutionalist approaches correctly emphasize these factors, 'but do not precisely explain their economic dimensions nor clearly describe their specific effects on household decisions.
In this paper, I develop a critique of both these perspectives which I hope will lay the foundation for a political economy of fertility decisions. My critical analysis of neoclassical economic assumptions represents.a clarification and a formalization of the insights of institutional theories, but leads toward some significant modifications of the institutional approach. Utilizing some of the tools of both Marxist and feminist theory, I develop three related hypotheses:
(1) The economic benefits of children are determined jointly by household specific factors such as levels of wealth and education and by institutional factors such as patriarchal control over children--control ~hich parents exercize over the labor and income of adult, as well as immature children.
(2) The economic costs of children, a large part of which consist of the opportunity rost of the mother's time, are determined jointly by household specific factors such as levels of wealth and education and by forms of patriarchal control over women which limit their bargaining power in the household and lower their real income. (3) Both these aspects of patriarchal control are rooted in the stn1cture of ownership of the means of production and can be expected to change in predictable ways as the class structure changeB. Any theory of patriarchal control and its effects on the demographic transaction must include a detailed consideration of the class structure and its transformation through the transition to capitalism.
Neoclassical Approaches: A Critique
The hallmark of neoclassical economics is its emphasis on the importance of individual choice. The distinguishing feature of the "new household economics" is its extension of the calculus of constrained 4 optimization to family decision making.
The household is pictured as a market within a market, with its own production function, its own utility function, its own supply curve, and its own demand curve. Although there are no formal prices assigned to inputs or outputs in the household, family members make decisions on the basis of implicit prices, some of which may be imputed from market prices.
Family members share a joint utility function which they seek to maximize. This joint utility function may be the outcome of agreement among all family members, or it may be imposed on the family by its own benevolent dictator. The tastes and preferences defined in this utility flDlction determine the family's demand for goods produced within the household as well as outside it. Families choose the combination of market purchased and home produced goods, and organize home. production in the most efficient way possible, given prices and incomes. The household production function is commonly assumed to be of a fixed coefficient or constant returns to scale type, and to exclude the possibility of joint productio1.
Own children cannot be purchased on the market, and must be produced at home. Within the neoclassical fr~mework, the demand for children is derived from the demand for child "services". These services include the flow of utility which children provide as well as any pecuniary transfers. The quantity of services which a child provides is determined by its "quality," a term defined economically as the amount of time and money invested in the child. This distinction between quantity and quality laysthe foundation for the claim that parentsr demand for children may go down even if their demand for child "services" remains the same. Parents may substitute quality for 6 quantity. Traditionally, children are described as consumer durables, yielding a flow of "utility" over their lifetime. More recent formulations, such as those of Evenson and Rosenzweig, accomodate the possibility that children may also be investment goods, yielding a flow of income over their lifetime. This modification has stimulated no basic changes in the model. The quantity-quality trade off treats child services in a reductionistic way, assuming that parents get back from children in utility or income some quantity proportional to the amount of time and money that they have invested. If this were the case, children truly would be reliable ~.QJl~>Umer durables and risk free investment goods. Only mortality could curtail their be~efits.
The significance of these specific criticisms should not be under- Individuals and families do make choices in response to prices which are determined through markets. But these choices are made in a specific economic context. They are constrained by the resources or endowments which define the domain of choice, and these constraints are determined by non-market economic factors.
-6-From a neoclassical perspective, the only·non-market factors relevant to choices are tastes and preferences. Any market outcome which appears inconsistent with the theory of optimization or rational choice is explained by reference to tastes and preferences. Thus, discrimination, a practice which is inefficient from a purely economic point of view,is explained as the result of a "taste" for discrimination. The fact that increases in income tend to lead to decreases in desired family size is anomalous, since increases in income are normally assumed to increase demand for goods. This anomaly is reconciled by the assumption that high income increases the demand for child quality rather than quantity.
Tastes and preferences certainly do exist, and do affect the process of market choice. But people do not exchange tastes and preferences on the market. They exchange goods and services. They cannot ~xchan8e what they do not own or control. The starting point of any process of exchange is the distribution of endowments.
Initial endowments could theoretically be distributed by a market mechanism. In reality, they are not. On the historical level they are determined by political forces and political conflict, which include forms of physical coercion. On the individual level, they are deter.mined by the· family into which one is born, and the skills and capital which are transferred by the previous generation.
Intergenerational transfer does not take place through a market process. Parents may choose the number of children they will have and the quantity of capital they will transfer to them. They cannot -7-and do not choose the children themselves, and i.f they are dissatisfied with their oYn children they cannot and do not trade them. Children, it must also be noted, do not choose their parents, and the endowments of capital which they receive are seldom related to any of their intrinsic characteristics.
Parents transfer resources to their own children simply because they are their o~'ll children. Such transfers are often reciprocal in nature. Children also transfer resources to their parents, especially when they become old and infirm. But there is no market process that ensures that these transfers will be equal or reciprocal. Parents may transfer less to children than they receive, and vice versa.
may transfer 100re to boys than to girls, and vice versa.
Parents
These aspects of intergenerational transfer affect market outco~e~,
because they determine what females in particular and chil<lren in general bring to the market. Children, as they mature, may make certain choices which are perfectly rational, but quite distinct from the choices they would have made if they had different endowments. This simple, even self-evident point is aptly illustrated by a consideration of the factors which affect the costs and benefits of children.
One of the major determinants of the cost of children is the cost of a mother's time. Time which women devote to childcare is time they could have utilized to perform some other type of work. The opportunity cost of children is clearly affected by women's production in the home and her earnings in the market. Neoclassical economists assume that this opportunity cost, or "shadow wage" is determined through a market.
Women are willing to supply a certain amount of labor at a certain price and both the formal labor market and the individual household demand a certain amount of labor at a certain price. The price of a woman's time should be determined by the intersection of supply and demand. If all women were equally discriminated against, both in the relative value of their endowments and in the market wage rate, discrimination per se would not affect cross-sectional differences between households, and neoclassical predictions regarding the effects of differences in wealth and education between households might be borne out If levels of discrimination and distributions of endowments change over time, however, as they almost certainly do, cross-sectional differences will not necessarily be reflected in historical trends.
The neoclassical analysis of the pecuniary benefits of children also overlooks the non-market factors that define the context of parent's choices, despite the fact that these factors are also likely to change over time. Until industrialization parents in the hest could control their children's choice of spouse largely through control over inheritance, for land was almost the only potential source of incone. The farm youth could not marry without his father's permission, because by his own effort, he could not gain enough money with which to buy land. Throughout most of the West, a dowry system was followed, so that the girls' chances of marrying were negli~'.ible unless her family w~s willing to present her with a sufficient marriage gift. 16 Berkner There are a numher of obvious motives for male domination. Men who wield greater economic and political power than women may directly benefit from unequal exchanr,e. dcm3nding more boods ancl services than they would otherwise receive. But women's capacity for childbearing provides an additional motive for male domination--men's potential benefit from their children. And women's biological potential provides an additional mechanism for male domination. Nothering makes women more physically vulnerable and more economically dependent. It enforces specialization in a form of production that requires a certain biological capacity and specific type of socialization but utilizes relatively little skill or capital. Mothering tends to limit women's participation in the types of exchange and interaction that are crucial to most forms of political activity.
Many aspects of patriarchal control over women are related to their social role as mothers, and all fonns of patriarchal control affect women as mothers. Any woman 1 s decision to marry is affected by the viability of alternatives to marriage. Any woman's choice to bear a child is circunscribed by her freedoY.J or lack of freedom to make an independent clwice.
Motivated in large part by feminist concerns, a growing literature documents both his tori cal and contemporary fonns of inequality between the 26 sexes.
Th ts research firmly establishes th.at, whatever its origins, this inequality is strongly rooted in inequality in control and ownership of wealth. In preindustrial England and the United States, the wife and mother of the family unit exercized no legal or formal control over land. A woman sometimes gained legal control of land after her husband's death, but women often held land only in trust for their children. Unmarried women who inherited property of ten received a guaranteed income from property held in trust, or received money rather than land.
Sindlarly clearcut inequalities typify many areas of the developing world. There is tremendous variation in legal institutions regarding -18-female property rights, but the only area of the world with a strong 27 tradition of female land ownership is Africa. Today, legislation in many areas of the developing world is far more aiuitable than it was in the now developed countries at a comparable level of development. This may be attributed at least in part to. the fact that the developed capitalist countries 28 have sought to impose their norms upon client regimes. Despite this variation, however, few women in many developing countries own or control a means of production co!nparable to that which men of the same class own or control.
As can be seen from Table 1 , women are more underrepresented in the employer/own account worker category than in the labor force as a whole. They outnumber men only in the unpaid family worker category.
In addition to ditferenc~s in wealth ownership, patriarchal societies are characterized by strong sanctions against female participation in certain types of economic activity. The most extreme example is the Hoslem practice of purdah> which makes it difficult for women to work at all out-... --~ 29 side the uu•uc.
Eyen sanctions which take the relatively benign form of disapproval or protective legislation tend to reinforce women's speeialization in certain sex segregated tasks. These tasks are almost always less productive and less remunerative than men's.
In equality in wealth, occupational segregation and direct discrimination have the combined effect of lowering women's wages relative to men's. Almost ever)"Nhere in the world women tend to earn between 60% and 90% of what men earn· In the second place, children obviously recognize that they will some day become parents, and are unlikely to pursue strategies which might ultimately weaken their position vis a vis their own children.
The conflict of interest between parents and children over the disposition of family income is muted by the fact that they are interdependent. Parents must take into account both their children's future productivity and their loyalty and obedience. The fact that they receive economic benefits from children does not necessarily motivate them to rear as many children as possible. They may be better off, given the quantity of land, capital, or resources that they could own, to reduce family size so that their children's endowments are not diluted.3 2 . If mortality falls, parents are likely to recognize that the increase in surviving children will affect the family's economic lifecycle, and to respond accordingly.
The patriarchal control hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the neoclassical economic claim that parents take into account the "quality" of children as well as the quantity. It merely introduces an additior.al dimension: An increase in a childs' education will improve the economic welfare of the entire family only if the child actually transfers some of its own gains back to the family.
Similarly, analysis of forms of patriarchal control over women does not preclude the importance of household specific factors, such as education and wealth. Rather, it looks beyond these household specific factors to society-wide institutions which enforce sexual inequality. Neoclassical economists underestimate the importance of sex-based discri.inination and exploitation not only because they conflict with the vision of free choice within the market, but also because they deem them "irrational"--inconsistent with social optimality. Total lifetime benefits, BT, are primarily determined by three factors: the expectancy of the chilu, the income that he or she earns (or, in non market production, the total value of the product), and the percentage of that income which is remitted to parents. The wage rate which women rece1vc is affected_by discrimination and occupational segregation. The value of women's home production may be equal to or greater than the value of men's home production. But if they work longer hours than men in the home, which is likely to be the case if there is sex discrimination in the market, the marginal product is lower than men's. The ratio of the female wage or marginal product to the male wage or marginal product is likely to be less one. One conspicuous change in the class structure is the gradual proletarianization of the labor force which occurs in the course of economic development.· When male heads of household lose control over their independent means of production and become wage laborers, the value of the tangible property which they can convey to their children is reduced. Wage labor provides sons (and to a more limited extent, daughters), with access to employment independent of their fathers.
The effect of economic development upon class structure> and, in particular, on family farms and businesses, has been studiously ignored ' Yet employers, own account workers, and unpaid family workers tend to comprise a large portion of the labor force in countries with high levels of fertility, as can be seen from Table 3 .
Furthermore, changes in class structure are closely correlated with increases in Gross National Product, education, and percent urban, all structural variables which are correlated with fertility decline.
The effects of institutional change and transformation of the class structure upon women are more difficult to ascertain. Hale/female lo.Tage differentials persist even in the most de•1eloped countries. This is only one of the reasons ~ily some scholars argue that patriarchal control 37 over women is essentially unaffected by capitalist development. Some argue, in fact 38 that the advent of capitalism worsens women's position. This argument overlooks the tremendous impact which fertility decline . has on the content of women's work. When women invest a great deal of time in childrearing, part of the productivity of their work lies in the expected returns from their adult children's labor. As these returns diminish, a sexual division of labor which channels women into childbearing and childrearing becomes quite costly to individual families. While men actively resist changes which reduce the direct services which women provide them with in the home, they cannot support wives who are neither producing much nor "investing" time in productive children. Women are increasingly forced to seek forms of employment which are more directly productive. It would be facile to suggest that economic dev~lopment automatically improves the position of women and children. But economic development does modify those forms of patriarchal control which directly affect the costs and benefits of children. Caldwell correctly locates the institutional factors which affect fertility decisions in the "familial mode of production" and explains that this familial mode is transformed by the transition to capitalism.
His argument points to the need for detailed historical and empirical analyses of changes in class structure and state involvement in the education of the young and the care of the elderly. Changes in the social relations of family life do not result from changes in wages and prices or new, "modern" tastes and preferences. They are the product of a process of struggle between generatior.s, sexes, and classes, struggles which both affect and are affected by the transition to capitalism.
